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Abstract
This paper is in three parts. The rst part discusses the workings
of a wage subsidy scheme in boosting employment and earnings of
workers. The second part reviews the empirical evidence on the eec-
tiveness of wage subsidy schemes in countries that have implemented
them both as countercyclical policies as well as structural programs to
boost long-term earnings and employment of low wage workers. The
third part looks at Singapore as a case study of how wage subsidies
have been used in a program for generating economic inclusion both in
the context of growth as well as in the context of business uctuations.
1 Introduction
At the heart of a meaningful life is the holding of a steady job. Holding a job
on a regular basis not only provides a steady source of income that is needed
to provide for one's lifetime consumption and that of dependants. This is the
pecuniary reward from work. In addition, there are non-pecuniary rewards
from work. The workplace provides a continuing stream of problems that
need to be solved, which stretches one's capacity for problem solving. One
learns to set goals and work assiduously to achieve them. In the process,
one discovers the joy of growing intellectually. Even if a job seems mundane,
the very habit of going to work regularly and delivering an honest day's
work for the pay one receives enhances self respect. Attributes like being
punctual and keeping at a problem until it is solved are all learned at the
workplace. At work, one also meets interesting colleagues who provide the
social interactions that we all need to be fully functioning human beings.
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When the level of joblessness is high, and especially when the duration of
unemployment is also high, many people not only lose their regular source of
income. Research shows that the costs of prolonged unemployment not only
include the direct loss of incomes but also deep emotional and psychological
scars. As eorts to look for a regular job end up in failure, deep discourage-
ment and pessimism set in. This, in turn, aects the quality of relationships
that the jobless person has with others. Moreover, prolonged unemployment
results in an erosion of skills.
The cost of joblessness is not only borne by the jobless individual himself
or herself. There are also negative spillovers on the rest of society. One
channel is scal. When many members of a society are unemployed, there is
the obvious loss of a potential tax base to generate government revenue to
fund programs in education and public goods that benet the rest of society.
There is the possibility of multiple equilibria working through a scal channel.
A society with a low unemployment rate has more members paying taxes that
fund public education and high quality infrastructure that support a highly
productive economy capable of delivering jobs with good pay. On the other
hand, there also exists an equilibrium with high unemployment where the
marginal tax rates on the remaining tax paying agents are so high that it
leads to a shrinkage of the productive sector and thus fewer good jobs.
Another channel works through expectations. When businesses decide
whether to undertake major investments in new initiatives, they look both
at whether there will be demand for the new products they launch as well
as at whether they can nd a creative workforce to design and experiment
with the new products. When a signicant share of the labor force has been
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without work for a long time, the domestic market would not have the critical
mass of venturesome consumers who have the nancial means and aptitude
to try out the new products.1 When there is a high incidence of long term
unemployment, the prospective rms also expect that it would be dicult
to nd the job-ready workers who know the market well enough to try out
and experiment with new products. As a result, few rms set up in such
an economy or few existing rms make investments to try out new products
thus depriving the economy of new productive jobs.
There exists the hope of jump-starting an economy caught in a high un-
employment trap so that a process is started that moves it to an alternative
equilibrium that exhibits low unemployment and better pay. This paper dis-
cusses the part that can be played by a wage subsidy scheme in an overall
program to generate growth and economic inclusion. This agenda item is of
particular signicance for South Africa. In the OECD Economic Surveys:
South Africa, July 2010, it was argued that even before the external reces-
sionary shock associated with the credit crisis from late 2008 hit the economy,
the unemployment rate averaged 20 percent. Among young people, the un-
employment rate was even higher. The external shock raised the average
unemployment rate to 25 percent with a higher incidence among young peo-
ple. It would be helpful to discuss wage subsidy schemes in the context both
of saving jobs in the face of a collapse of aggregate demand as well as in
the context of a structural policy to boost the employment and earnings of
1See the argument for the importance of having a suciently large base of venturesome
consumers for a fully functioning dynamic economy in the work of Amar Bhide. In partic-
ular, see his 2008 book, The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity
in a More Connected World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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workers at the bottom end of the income distribution.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
workings of a wage subsidy scheme in boosting employment and earnings
of workers. Section 3 reviews the empirical evidence on the eectiveness
of wage subsidy schemes in countries that have implemented them both as
countercyclical policies as well as structural programs to boost long-term
earnings and employment of low wage workers. Section 4 looks at Singapore
as a case study of how wage subsidies have been used in a program for
generating economic inclusion both in the context of growth as well as in the
context of business uctuations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Workings of a Wage Subsidy Scheme
At the simplest level, the aim of a wage subsidy scheme is to boost the
employment and the take-home earnings of workers, particularly low wage
workers. A wage subsidy (sometimes also called an employment subsidy)
can be given directly either to a rm or to a worker. When given directly to
the rm, it reduces the rm's marginal factor cost, that is, with the subsidy,
the addition to total cost from employing one more worker is reduced by the
amount of the subsidy. When given directly to a worker, a condition is that
the qualifying worker must be employed. Thus, a wage subsidy is unlike a
welfare entitlement as the latter is given regardless of the employment status.2
2Milton Friedman's proposal of a negative income tax is not an example of a wage
subsidy since a person with zero income would still receive the grant under his proposal.
See Milton Friedman, 1962, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. Since the grant received is not tied to employment in Friedman's proposal, it lacks
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A wage subsidy given directly to a worker is essentially a workfare income
supplement as it supplements the salary that the employer pays.3
But how does the granting of a wage subsidy work to boost employment
and take-home pay of low wage workers? There are two main premises of
the analysis: (i) Workers and rms respond to nancial incentives; and (ii) A
the feature of creating incentives for the recipient of the grant to hold on to a job. If, as
we argued in the Introduction, work has many non-pecuniary rewards, we would want to
use limited scal resources to not only augment the spending power of those in the bottom
of the income distribution but also strengthen their attachment to the workplace.
3The U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program is an example of a workfare
income supplement scheme. Singapore has implemented two dierent schemes. Its Work-
fare Income Supplement (WIS) scheme gives the wage subsidy directly to the worker and
was implemented in 2007. After a review of the scheme to ascertain its eectiveness in
boosting employment and pay, the scheme was further expanded to include more qualify-
ing people in 2010. The WIS program is meant to be a structural policy aimed at boosting
the take-home pay and employment of low wage workers as the Singapore economy faced
the eects of a secular shift in demand away from low wage workers arising from shifts in
comparative advantage and skill-biased technological change. At the beginning of 2009, in
the face of the fallout from the credit crisis that led to a sharp fall in aggregate demand,
Singapore introduced a Jobs Credit scheme where the subsidy was given directly to rms.
The Jobs Credit scheme was a countercyclical policy aimed to save jobs and ended in July
2010 when the Singapore economy made a strong recovery in the rst two quarters of
2010. In previous decades, such as during the sharp and deep recession in 1985-86 and the
Asian nancial crisis of 1997-98, a major plank of a counter-recessionary policy included
wage subsidies given directly to rms that were eected through cuts in employers' Central
Provident Fund (CPF) contributions. (The CPF is Singapore's dened contribution social
security system. For each worker on a rm's payroll, both the employee and the employer
make a monthly contribution that goes into the retirement fund of the worker.) These
CPF cuts were gradually restored when the economy recovered from the recessions.
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new equilibrium in the labor market is reached after workers and employers
have responded to the wage subsidy. When the wage subsidy is given directly
to the rm, there is a boost to labor demand at any given wage so the labor
demand curve shifts out; when given directly to the worker, there is a greater
incentive to work so there is a shift of the labor supply curve in a neoclassical
model of the labor market. In the case of an eciency wage model or a search
and matching model of the labor market, the neoclassical labor supply curve
is replaced by a wage curve. Once a curve has shifted in the labor market
diagram in response to the granting of a wage subsidy, the economy generally
achieves equilibrium at a new employment level and a new wage rate. Our
prior expectations are that the new post-subsidy equilibrium should coincide
with higher employment and higher take-home pay. To see how that outcome
is achieved, however, we need to draw upon what we can learn from labor
economics.
It will help us organize our discussion by considering how a wage subsidy
works to boost employment and pay, rst, in a neoclassical model of the labor
market, second, in an eciency wage labor market, and, third, in a search
and matching model of the labor market.4
4The 2010 Nobel prize for Economic Sciences was awarded to Professors Peter Dia-
mond, Dale Mortensen, and Christopher Pissarides for their work in developing the search
and matching model of the labor market. In contrast to the frictionless neoclassical la-
bor market, the search and matching model emphasizes the fact that there is a lot of
heterogeneity in the types of jobs and that there are frictions that prevent a rm from
instantaneously nding a suitable worker with the right skills and aptitude for the job and
that prevent a worker from nding his or her ideal job immediately. Thus job vacancies
and unemployment can coexist. The 2006 Nobel prize winner, Professor Edmund Phelps,
in his seminal paper introducing the expectations-augmented-Phillips curve to study in-
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2.1 Neoclassical model of labor market
The neoclassical model of the labor market is the right place to start our
analysis even if it is not the place to end if we are interested in unemployment,
particularly, involuntary unemployment where there exist people who would
like to get a job at the prevailing wage but who cannot succeed in getting
one. The neoclassical model helps us to develop our intuition about how a
wage subsidy works in a market setting to boost employment and pay.
There are two sides of the labor market represented by the labor demand
curve and the labor supply curve, respectively. Let us rst study how a wage
subsidy given directly to a rm aects the rm's labor demand decision. To
grasp the rm's employment decision, we study the rm's behavior in a com-
petitive market. The rm is assumed to maximize its prot by choosing the
optimal number of workers to employ given the production function relat-
ing the rm's output, Y , to its factor inputs given the level of technology.
Suppose that there is a given capital stock, K, that the rm's workers use
ation and unemployment, also introduced one of the rst examples of an eciency wage
labor market. The idea is that an employee's eort on the job and his or her propensity
to quit are both directly aected by the wage paid by the rm relative to the wage that
the worker can expect to earn elsewhere in the economy. As a result, a rm may save cost
directly by lowering its own wage rate but, indirectly, that unilateral wage cut acts to raise
unit cost of production because either workers' eort declines in response or more workers
quit. Since it costs something for the rm to train new employees, the need to replace
those who quit end up raising business cost. Thus there is a limit to how far the wage
rate can fall, and at the eciency wage rate chosen by rms, involuntary unemployment
generally exists. (See Edmund Phelps, 1968, \Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-Market
Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, 76(4, Part 2):678-711.)
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to produce the output given the level of technology represented by an index
A. Letting N represent employment, the production function can be repre-
sented by Y = AF ( K;N). Let wf be the real wage rate, that is, the wage
rate after adjusting for ination, per unit of labor paid by the rm. Then
the take-home pay per unit of labor received by the worker can be written
as wh  (1 + sw)wf , where sw is the subsidy rate. Thus a value of sw = 0:1
means a 10 percent subsidy rate. The rm's maximization problem can be
written as
Maximize AF ( K;N) 
 
wh
1 + sw
!
N
by choosing N . The rst-order condition from the optimal choice of employ-
ment is
AFN( K;N) =
wh
1 + sw
; (1)
where AFN( K;N) is the value marginal product of labor in real terms and
the righthand side term in equation (1) is the marginal factor cost. Un-
der the usual assumption of diminishing marginal product of labor, that is,
AFNN( K;N) < 0, we get the result that, at a given real wage received by
the worker, an increase in the wage subsidy rate, say from zero to 10 percent,
results in an increase in optimal employment, Nd. In the usual labor market
diagram, there is a rightward shift of the labor demand curve. We get a
useful result:
Result 1: An increase in the wage subsidy rate given directly to the rm
shifts out the rm's labor demand curve.
We now turn to the determination of labor supply. Economists speak
about labor supply behavior at both the intensive and extensive margins.
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At the intensive margin, we would like to know how higher take-home pay
leads someone who is already employed to work more hours or weeks. At the
extensive margin, we would like to know how higher take-home pay aects
the number of people who were previously not working to start working.
Let us begin with labor supply at the intensive margin. How does an
individual who is already employed decide whether to work more or less
hours or weeks? We introduce the notion of a utility function that relates an
individual's index of felicity to his or her consumption level and amount of
leisure. Each individual has a given time endowment (like 52 weeks in a year)
that can be allocated to work or leisure. Letting L be the time endowment,
C be the level of consumption, L the amount of leisure, and representing
the individual's utility function by U(C;L), the individual's maximization
problem can be written as
Maximize U(C;L)
subject to
C = wh(L  L) +B;
where B is nonwage income, by choosing consumption and labor supply.
Does a worker, who is currently employed, work more or less hours when
his or her take-home wage rate, wh, increases? There are two eects. Because
the reward to work is greater when the take-home pay is increased, the worker
is induced to forgo leisure and supply more hours. This is the substitution
eect of a higher take-home pay. However, a higher take-home pay also
makes the individual feel richer, which encourages him or her to take more
leisure and thus supply less labor. This is the income eect of higher pay. If
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the substitution eect is stronger than the income eect, the result is that a
higher take-home pay encourages increased number of hours or weeks worked.
This leads to an upward-sloping labor supply curve, where labor supply, N s,
is equal to time endowment minus leisure.
Next, let us turn to labor supply behavior at the extensive margin. In
this model, we assume that a job requires a worker to work a xed number of
hours.5 An economically active individual then only has to decide whether
to work or not to work. However, the economically active population of indi-
viduals have dierent levels of disutility from work that can be summarized
by a cumulative distribution function, H(m), where m is a measure of the
disutility level from work. There is a cuto disutility level, denoted m, that
can be solved such that individuals in the distribution whose disutility levels
lie below m will voluntarily choose to work and those whose disutility levels
lie above m will choose to be out of the labor force. What an increase in
the take-home pay does is to raise the cuto disutility level, m, so that, at
the extensive margin, labor supply increases, that is, more people choose to
work.
To demonstrate how an increase in the take-home pay leads more eco-
nomically active individuals to choose to work, we proceed as follows. For
simplicity, we assume that the disutility level from work is uniformly dis-
tributed between m and m. An individual has the following utility function:
logC + log(L  ml), where C is consumption, L is a constant, and l is the
xed number of hours worked. For convenience, we set l = 1. When an
5See Peter Diamond, 1980, \Income Taxation with Fixed Hours of Work," Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 13, 101-110.
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individual is economically inactive, his or her consumption is equal to B, the
nonwage income. Such an economically inactive person's utility function can
be written as logB + log L. When the individual chooses to work, he or she
earns a take-home wage of wh. Since consumption is now equal to wh + B,
we can write the utility function for the worker as log[wh+B] + log(L m).
It is then straightforward to see that the cuto disutility level from work,
m, is obtained when the individual is indierent between working and not
working, that is, it is the solution to the following equation:
log[wh +B] + log(L m) = logB + log L:
It is readily shown (see footnote) that m is increasing in wh so that a higher
take-home pay leads to an increase in labor supply at the extensive margin.6
The neoclassical model of labor supply at the extensive margin, therefore,
predicts that the labor supply curve is positively sloped.
We have all the ingredients now to have our basic model to illustrate how
a wage subsidy given to the rm acts to boost employment and take-home
pay of workers. When rms are given a wage subsidy, Result 1 tells us that
the labor demand curve shifts out. Consequently, at the original equilibrium
wage, there is an excess demand for labor. The increased competition by
rms for workers arising from the wage subsidy serves to bid up the market
price of labor, which is the take-home pay of workers. Thus, our second
important result is as follows:
6We note that we can rewrite the equation as log
h
wh+B
B
i
= log
h
L
L m
i
, from which,
after simplication, we obtain m =
h
wh
wh+B
i
L. With B > 0, an increase in wh increases
m.
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Result 2: A wage subsidy given directly to rms results in increased com-
petition by rms for workers. As a result, the take-home pay of workers is
pushed up and employment is increased.
We now have a view of how a wage subsidy given directly to rms works to
boost employment and earnings of low wage workers. But we may ask what
factors determine the quantitative magnitude of the eects on employment
and take-home pay of workers. Suppose that the wage subsidy rate is 10
percent. By how much will employment rise? And by how much will the
take-home pay of workers rise? Economists provide an answer to these two
important questions by expressing the percentage change in employment and
percentage change in take-home pay in response to, say, a 10 percent subsidy
rate in terms of the elasticities of labor demand and labor supply.7
Let labor supply be represented by N s = Ns(wh) and labor demand be
represented by Nd = Nd(wf ). In labor-market equilibrium, labor demand
equals labor supply so
Nd(wf ) = Ns(wh): (2)
Taking derivatives through equation (2), and noting that wf  wh=(1 + sw),
we can show that
d logwh
dsw
=

 + 
; (3)
where  is the wage elasticity of labor supply and  is the wage elasticity of
labor demand. Further using the inverse labor demand curve and the inverse
7Formally, the elasticity of labor demand is dened as the percentage change in labor
demanded in response to a percentage change in the cost of labor. Correspondingly, the
elasticity of labor supply is dened as the percentage change in labor supplied in response
to a percentage change in the take-home wage rate.
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labor supply curve, we can then show that
d logN
dsw
=

 + 
: (4)
Suppose that the labor supply elasticity is high ( is high), that is, a
given wage increase can solicit a large increase in labor supply. According
to equations (3) and (4), we draw the conclusion that the introduction of
a wage subsidy has a relatively large eect on employment and a relatively
small positive eect on take-home wage rate when labor supply elasticity is
high. Next, suppose that the labor demand elasticity is high ( is high),
that is, a given decline in labor cost can solicit a large increase in labor
demand. Then, according to equations (3) and (4), we draw the conclusion
that the introduction of a wage subsidy has a relatively large positive eect
on employment as well as a relatively large positive eect on take-home wage
rate when labor demand elasticity is high. We can summarize our ndings
in the following useful result:
Result 3: The introduction of a wage subsidy has a relatively large positive
eect on employment but a relatively small positive eect on take-home wage
rate if the wage elasticity of labor supply is high. On the other hand, a wage
subsidy has a relatively large positive eect on employment as well as on
take-home wage rate if the wage elasticity of labor demand is high.
The neoclassical model of the labor market with labor supply decisions
made at the extensive margin (whether to work or not to work a xed number
of hours) has the tight implication that a wage subsidy given to the rm in-
duces more people to enter the labor force and immediately nd employment.
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Those not working choose voluntarily to stay out of the labor force because
it is deemed that the reward to work (the take-home pay rate) is too low to
make it worth the while for these individuals to enter the job market. There
is no unemployment and thus no job rationing in the neoclassical model of
labor market. To incorporate unemployment, we need to go beyond the neo-
classical model. There are two other models of the labor market where there
does exist unemployment. The rst is the eciency wage model, sometimes
also called the incentive-wage model; the other is the search and matching
model of the labor market.
2.2 Eciency wage model of labor market
The major insight of the eciency wage model of the labor market is that
rms need to adopt a wage policy (in the simplest case, to choose a wage
rate) to encourage the optimal level of eort by its workforce. In this way,
the theory departs from the neoclassical model of the labor market where
every rm is a price taker and only chooses the optimal number of workers
to hire at the prevailing market wage rate. As workers are prone to exert
less than the required eort level, unless closely supervised, the rm has an
incentive to choose a wage rate to minimize wage costs per unit of eort.
In such an economy, even though a rm saves direct cost by cutting wages,
it has to tackle the problem of weak morale and weakened job attachment
brought about by the wage cut, which indirectly raises business costs. The
rm, therefore, has to decide on the wage that minimizes eective cost, and
then at that eciency wage level, decide the optimal number of workers to
hire. This eciency wage rate will typically be above market clearing so
15
unemployment results.
Suppose that the level of worker's eort can be represented by the func-
tion, e(wh=z), where wh is the take-home pay adjusted for ination at the
particular rm the worker is employed at and z is the expected income if
not employed at that rm. We write z  (1   u)wh + uB, where u is the
unemployment rate and B is income support in the event that the worker is
without a job. The rm which operates in an eciency wage labor market
can be thought of as solving a two-step problem. The rst step is to choose
an eciency wage to minimize eective cost, that is, wage cost per unit of
eort; the next step is to choose the prot-maximizing level of employment
at that chosen eciency wage.
The condition from choosing the wage rate, wf , to minimize the eective
cost, wf=e(wh=z), is given by the famous Solow elasticity condition:8
 
wh
z
!24e0

wh
z

e

wh
z

35 = 1: (5)
The optimal choice of eciency wage gives a value represented by (wh=z) =
constant = k that satises the Solow elasticity condition where marginal
eort is equal to average eort. As an example, suppose that the eort
function is given by
e
 
wh
z
!
=
"
wh
z
  
#
; 0 <  < 1:
In this case, (wh=z) = =(1   ) so k = =(1   ). Suppose that the
economy cannot fall below two percent without it being innitely costly to
8See Robert Solow, \Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness,"Journal of Macroe-
conomics, Vol. 1, Winter, pp. 79-82.
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induce worker eort. The value of k that leads to this condition is k = 1:02.
Implicit dierentiation gives us the slope of what may be called a wage curve
or a pseudo-labor supply curve, which replaces the conventional neoclassical
labor supply curve:
dwh
d(1  u)

slope of wage curve
=
k[wh  B]
1  k(1  u) : (6)
As we can see, the wage curve is positively sloped in the employment rate|
output plane for unemployment rates above two percent, assuming that wh >
B. This means that as the unemployment rate declines, the eciency wage
the rm has to pay to minimize eective cost must correspondingly rise.
Given the eciency wage represented by (wh=z), the rm chooses the
optimal number of workers to employ. The rm's maximization problem can
now be written as
Maximize AF
 
K; e
 
wh
z
!
N
!
 
 
wh
1 + sw
!
N
by choosing N where eective employment is given by eort multiplied by
number of employed workers. The rst-order condition from the optimal
choice of employment is
e
 
wh
z
!
AFN
 
K; e
 
wh
z
!
N
!
=
wh
1 + sw
; (7)
If this is a representative rm, and there are as many rms as there are
members of the workforce, then N  1   u. This gives a downward-sloping
labor demand curve in the employment rate|output plane.
Using an eciency wage labor market framework, we can now see that
giving a wage subsidy directly to the rm has the eect of shifting out the
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labor demand curve. In contrast to the neoclassical model of the labor mar-
ket, however, we have the result that the increased competition for labor as
a result of the wage subsidy leads to higher take-home pay as well as reduced
unemployment. A wage subsidy in the eciency wage model, therefore, saves
jobs!
Equilibrium in the labor market here is represented by the rate of un-
employment that reconciles the rm's demand wage (the wage on the labor
demand curve at a given unemployment rate) to the eciency wage (the
wage on the wage curve at a given unemployment rate). If we now let 
represent the elasticity of the wage curve (or pseudo-labor supply curve) and
 represent the wage elasticity of the labor demand curve, we can express
the incidence of a wage subsidy by the following two formulae:
d logwh
dsw
=

 + 
; (8)
d log(1  u)
dsw
=

 + 
: (9)
To be more concrete, if we let (wh=z) = constant = k, we can show that the
elasticity of the wage curve, that is, the percentage change in the employment
rate in response to a percentage point change in the take-home real wage, ,
can be written as
 =
1  k(1  u)
k(1  u)
h
1 

B
wh
i : (10)
If we let B=wh = 0:5 and the unemployment rate be 25 percent, we nd
that, with k = 1:02, the elasticity of the wage curve, , is equal to 0.62; if
the unemployment rate is 40 percent, then, with k = 1:02, the elasticity of
the wage curve, , is equal to 1.26. Using the result that the elasticity of the
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wage curve is higher the higher the initial unemployment rate in equation
(10), we have the following result:
Result 4: A one percentage point increase in the wage subsidy rate has a
stronger eect on lowering the unemployment rate the higher the initial rate
of unemployment.
Before leaving this section, it should be pointed out that the original
article by Professor Robert Solow introducing the dependence of the eort
function on on a worker's remuneration made a worker's eort simply a func-
tion of the real wage, that is, the eort function is written as e(wh). As an
example, suppose that e(wh) = (wh   ); 0 <  < 1. One way to interpret
this function is to suggest that low wage workers need a real wage earn-
ing that would provide a minimum level of nutrition to be able to be fully
functioning employees at the workplace. In this case, the eciency wage is
independent of the rate of unemployment and is given by the original Solow
elasticity condition:
whe0(wh)
e(wh)
= 1:
With the specic eort function, e(wh) = (wh ); 0 <  < 1, the eciency
wage, wh is equal to =(1   ). This gives a rigid real wage; alternatively,
the wage curve has innite elasticity, that is,  =1. Using this value of  in
equation (9) gives us
d log(1  u)
dsw
= :
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2.3 Search and matching model of labor market
Jobs are heterogeneous and there are frictions that prevent rms from getting
their employees with the best t for the job and workers from nding their
ideal job immediately. Thus, at any point in time, some job vacancies are
unlled even as there are workers looking for jobs. A convenient device
called a matching function summarizes the number of successful job matches
as a function of the job vacancy rate (number of job vacancies per unit
of the labor force) denoted v, and the unemployment rate (the number of
unemployed persons per unit of the labor force) denoted u. We write the
matching function as a constant-returns-to-scale function, m(v; u). As an
example, let m(v; u) = v0:5u0:5.
The unemployment rate, u, is increasing in the product of the job separa-
tion rate, s, and the average duration of unemployment. In turn, the average
duration of unemployment is given by the inverse of the job accession rate,
a  m=u. With the particular form of matching function given in the last
paragraph, the job accession rate is given by a = (v=u)0:5. Thus the average
duration of unemployment, 1=a, is decreasing in the measure of labor market
tightness, v=u, the number of job vacancies per unemployed worker. When
the inow into unemployment is equal to the outow from the unemployment
pool, we have s(1  u) = au. Thus, we have
u
1  u = s

1
a

: (11)
From equation (11), we get the following result:
Result 5: Ceteris paribus, if a wage subsidy reduces the average duration
of unemployment, it also reduces the rate of unemployment.
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Let us now study how a wage subsidy given to rms act to reduce the
average duration of unemployment. To do so, we rst study the decision of
rms with regards to the creation of job vacancies. An asset-type equation
is used to think about the problem. Let Vf be the asset value of having a
lled job vacancy and Vv be the asset value of having an unlled job vacancy.
These asset values satisfy the following conditions:
rVf =  
 
wh
1 + sw
!
  s [Vf   Vv] ; (12)
rVv =  c+

1
a

[Vf   Vv] ; (13)
where we note that with the specic matching function we are using, the
number of successful job matches per unit of job vacancy is given by m=v =
1=a. Here, r is the exogenous real interest rate,  is worker productivity, and
we assume that it costs c to maintain a job vacancy.
If there is free entry into the business of creating job vacancies, compe-
tition drives the asset value of having a vacant job to zero, that is, Vv = 0.
Then, we note from equation (13) that Vf = ac. Further using this in
equation (12), we get
 
wh
1 + sw
!
= 
241  (r + s)c
1
a

35 : (14)
The longer the average duration of unemployment, the shorter is the average
duration of a job vacancy and thus the lower is the expected cost of main-
taining a job vacancy. Accordingly, the wage that the rm can aord to pay
is higher. Thus, the rm's aordable wage is rising in the average duration
of unemployment.
21
There are two approaches to thinking about wage determination. One
approach assumes that, as there are frictions in the labor market, both rm
and worker have some bargaining power so the individual worker engages in
decentralized wage bargaining with the rm, typically in the form of Nash
bargaining. If we follow this approach, we solve an asset-type problem for
the worker. Let the asset value to the worker in the state of being employed
be Ve and the asset value in the state of being unemployed be Vu. Then, we
have
rVe = w
h   s [Ve   Vu] ; (15)
rVu = B + a [Ve   Vu] ; (16)
where B is income support when unemployed. If we assume that the weight
giving the bargaining strength of the worker is , then the surplus that goes
to the worker is given by the share  of total surplus, that is, Ve   Vu =
[(Ve   Vu) + Vf ], where we have taken account of the fact that Vv = 0. We
can readily show that the bargained wage is given by
wh =
B +


1 
 h
r+s+a
1+r+a 1
i
(1 + c)
1 +


1 
 h
r+s+a
1+r+a 1
i h
1
1+sw
i : (17)
We see from equation (17) that the bargained wage is decreasing in the
average duration of unemployment.
Using equations (14) and (17), we can readily check that a wage subsidy
given to the rm acts to lower the average duration of unemployment.9 This
9At each a 1, the average duration of unemployment, an increase in sw raises the
aordable wage in equation (14) by more than it raises the bargained wage given by
equation (17). Thus, the aordable wage can be reconciled to the bargained wage in the
presence of a wage subsidy at a lower average duration of unemployment.
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result can be explained as follows. The wage subsidy given directly to the
rm lowers the rm's marginal cost of employing an additional worker thus
increasing the rm's aordable wage. At a given average duration of unem-
ployment, the aordable wage increases by exactly the amount 1 + sw. In
addition, part, but only part, of the increase in the rm's surplus due to the
wage subsidy goes to the worker given our assumption of Nash bargaining.
Consequently, the bargained wage also increases when the rm receives the
wage subsidy but it increases by less than the subsidy at a given average dura-
tion of unemployment. The result is that the bargained wage and aordable
wage can only be reconciled at a lower average duration of unemployment.
How applicable is the assumption of Nash bargaining over wages? With
Nash bargaining, the match between rm and worker is unsuccessful if there
is no agreement on the wage. If our focus is on low wage workers, it is possible
that a more realistic assumption about wage determination is simply that the
rm oers to potential workers a wage that it posts on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis with no opportunity for the worker to make a counteroer. Suppose
that the posted wage is given exogenously as wh. Then, substituting the
posted wage in equation (14), we obtain
 
wh
1 + sw
!
= 
241  (r + s)c
1
a

35 : (18)
Taking a derivative through equation (18), we obtain the elasticity of the
average duration of unemployment with respect to sw as given by
d log

1
a

dsw
=  
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
1
a

(r + s)c
  1
35 : (19)
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2.4 Wage subsidies when output is constrained by ag-
gregate demand
The models of labor market behavior we have studied so far to understand the
workings of a wage subsidy given directly to a rm all implicitly assume that
the output produced by employed workers can be sold. Yet, one issue that
arose in the recent credit crisis, and in other recessions, is that rms are not
hiring because the output produced by workers cannot be sold. Aggregate
demand, it is argued, constrains sales. With low aggregate demand in the
presence of sluggish nominal price levels, rms are not willing to hire because
they can't sell the goods produced. How does a wage subsidy work in such
an environment?
There is a new channel through which a wage subsidy given to rms
operate in such an environment. To see this, consider the following simple
two-period model. In the short run, the nominal price is rigid so in period 1,
output is determined by aggregate demand, Y AD. If the production function
is given by F (N), then employment is simply given by N = F 1( Y AD). Let
us suppose that rms choose to pay eciency wages to its employed workforce
in period 1 and 2, wh1 and w
h
2 , respectively. The present discounted value
of the rm's cash ows, V1, can be written as
V1 = Y
AD
1  
 
wh1
1 + sw1
!
F 1( Y AD1 ) +
F

e

wh2

N2

  wh2
1+sw2
1 + r
: (20)
If a rm in period 1 faces a sudden unexpected decline in aggregate demand,
Y AD1 , it is possible that V1 can turn negative in the absence of a wage subsidy.
With the rm paying eciency wages, so that there are limits to wage cuts, it
is optimal for the rm to shut down if V1 < 0 leading to a retrenchment of the
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whole workforce. In such an environment, a wage subsidy paid to rms can
turn the value V1 from negative to positive thus improving the survivability
of rms and thus the retention of workers. This may be especially important
for small and medium-sized business rms that face limited access to credit
markets in a recessionary environment.
Yet another channel through which a wage subsidy given directly to a rm
can help in reducing retrenchments during a recession is by encouraging labor
hoarding for the short term. Employees at rms tend to develop rm-specic
expertise that new hires need time to acquire. Thus employing a new worker
always involves some rm-specic training that adds to the rm's cost. If
a recessionary shock is expected to be short-lived, the rm has an incentive
to hold on to its workforce until the economy recovers. In such a situation,
wage subsidies to rms give the extra nancial muscle for more rms to hold
on to their workers. We have another result:
Result 6: In the short run when sales are constrained by aggregate demand
due to nominal price sluggishness, a wage subsidy given to rms can turn
the present discounted value of rms' cash ows from negative to positive
thus improving the survivability of rms and thus the retention of workers.
It also encourages labor hoarding over the short term.
2.5 Quantitative magnitudes: Some illustrative num-
bers
To get a sense of empirical magnitudes of the eects of a wage subsidy in a
neoclassical model of the labor market, we can use some illustrative values of
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the elasticities based upon the useful survey of Professor Lawrence Katz.10
Suppose that the labor supply elasticity () is approximately 0.4 and the
labor demand elasticity () is approximately 0.5. Substituting these elasticity
values into equations (3) and (4) yields the result that a 10 percent subsidy
rate would expand employment by approximately 2 percent and take-home
wage rate by approximately 5 to 6 percent.
The neoclassical model has the feature that a worker who is not currently
employed is out of the labor force. There is no unemployment. Turning to
the eciency wage model, where there exists job rationing, if we take the
elasticity of the labor demand curve to be 0.5, and recalling that the elasticity
of the wage curve is larger the higher is the initial rate of unemployment,
we can consider the following illustrative numbers. If unemployment income
as a ratio to take-home pay (B=wh) is 0.5 and the initial unemployment
rate is 0.25, we nd that substituting these elasticity values into equations
(8) and (9) yields the result that a 10 percent subsidy rate would expand
the employment rate by approximately 3 percent and take-home wage rate
by approximately 4 to 5 percent. If, instead, the unemployment income as
a ratio to take-home pay (B=wh) is 0.5 and the initial unemployment rate
is 0.40, we nd that substituting these elasticity values into equations (8)
and (9) yields the result that a 10 percent subsidy rate would expand the
employment rate by approximately 3.5 to 4 percent and take-home wage rate
by approximately 3 percent. The higher elasticity of the wage curve leads to
10See Lawrence Katz, 1998, \Wage Subsidies for the Disadvantaged," in Peter
Gottschalk and Richard Freeman, eds., Generating Jobs : How to Increase Demand for
Low-Skilled Workers, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 21-54.
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a bigger impact on employment and smaller impact on take-home pay. In the
case where the worker's eort function depends only on the real take-home
wage so that the eciency wage is also a rigid real wage, we nd that a
one-percent subsidy rate increases the employment rate by the size of labor
demand elasticity, . If we take  = 0:5, we obtain the result that a 10
percent wage subsidy raises the employment rate by 5 percent.
Finally, turning to the search and matching model with wage posting
so that low wage workers do not make counteroers in a wage bargaining
situation, we can ask how much impact there is on the average duration of
unemployment and thus on the unemployment rate of a wage subsidy rate
of 10 percent. Returning to equation (11), if u = 0:25, s = 0:3, we get an
average duration of unemployment of a calendar year. Suppose, in addition,
r = 0:1 and c = 0:3 where c gives the fraction of the cost of maintaining a
job vacancy taken as a ratio to worker productivity, . We nd that with
these parameters, a 10 percent subsidy rate reduces the average duration of
unemployment by about 70 percent, that is, it reduces the average duration
of unemployment from a year to about four months. Using equation (11),
this implies that the unemployment rate is reduced from 25 percent to about
8 percent, which represents a 23 percent increase in employment rate.11 This
number is far greater than what we have found in the neoclassical model and
eciency wage model of the labor market and most likely gives an upper
11The calculation is as follows: At an unemployment rate of 25 percent and an annual
job separation rate of 30 percent (so the average duration of a job is about three years), we
get that the average duration of unemployment is about a year. If the average duration of
unemployment is reduced by a wage subsidy to four months or one-third of a year, using
the formula in equation (11) gives u/(1-u)=(0.3)(0.3)=0.09 so u=0.08.
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bound since a policy that has such a large eect on reducing the average
duration of unemployment most likely would put upward pressure on the
wage rate, which would act to reduce the impact of the wage subsidy.
2.6 Does it matter whether wage subsidy is given di-
rectly to rms or to workers?
We have so far focussed our discussion on giving the wage subsidy directly to
rms. Does it matter for the incidence of the wage subsidy whether the wage
subsidy is given directly to rms or workers. One result in public nance
theory is that, in the neoclassical model of the labor market, the incidence of
the wage subsidy is independent of whether the wage subsidy is given directly
to rms or workers. When given directly to rms, as we have seen, the
labor demand curve is shifted up, and as a result, employment is higher and
workers' take-home pay is increased. How much employment and take-home
pay are increased depends upon the respective elasticities of labor demand
and labor supply. If the wage subsidy were given directly to workers instead,
the labor supply curve shifts right and employment expands. Although the
wage cost faced by rms is reduced because of the excess supply of labor
induced by the wage subsidy to enter the labor force, the take-home pay is
increased due to the wage subsidy or wage income supplements. Despite this
important equivalence result in public nance theory, in practice, due to the
fact that information ow about the wage subsidy scheme to either side of
the labor market is likely to be imperfect, it matters whom the wage subsidy
is given directly to. Firms are more likely to be aware of a wage subsidy
if it is given directly to them, and so can act in response to the nancial
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incentives by increasing their labor demand. Particularly in the search and
matching model of the labor market where imperfect informational ows are
emphasized, a rm is less likely to be informed about a wage supplement
scheme that gives wage subsidies directly to workers. Therefore, if a wage
subsidy scheme is to be implemented in a recessionary environment, where
immediate action is important, it seems preferable to give wage subsidies
directly to rms to boost their demand for labor.
If the economy's structural rate of unemployment is very high among
low wage workers even when the economy is not in a recession, it appears
that the increased intensity of search for jobs that a wage subsidy given
directly to workers should induce would not have very much eect on the
unemployment rate.12 The problem of high unemployment might have more
to do the reluctance of rms to hire than with the reluctance of workers to
search for jobs. Firms, on the other hand, are likely to be more responsive to
creating additional job vacancies in response to a wage subsidy given directly
to them.
12If workers and rms engage in decentralized Nash bargaining over wages, giving a
wage subsidy directly to workers will lead to part of the surplus being given to rms in
the form of lower hiring cost which stimulates employment. However, if low wage workers
cannot make counteroers and face posted wages, the channel through which giving wage
subsidies directly to workers can expand employment is through increased intensity of job
search. As argued in the text, the problem of high structural unemployment might have
less to do with workers' reluctance to search for jobs and have more to do with the lack
of incentives on the part of rms to create job vacancies.
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3 Empirical Evidence
This section summarizes the ndings of work done by others to evaluate the
eectiveness of wage subsidies introduced either as a short-term countercycli-
cal policy measure or as a long-term structural policy to boost the earnings
and employment of low wage workers. We rst report the ndings on coun-
tercyclical policies and then go on to look at ndings on structural policies
aimed at boosting pay and employment.
(a) Bishop, John, 1981, \Employment in Construction and Distribution In-
dustries: The Impact of the New Jobs Tax Credit," in Sherwin Rosen, ed.,
Studies in Labor Markets, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press.
The New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) program introduced in the United
States in 1977 and eective from mid-1977 through 1978 under President
Jimmy Carter oered to employers a tax credit of 50 percent of the rst
$4,200 of wages per employee for increases in employment that was more
than two percent over the previous year. In being paid only on employment
in excess of some specic level, this is an example of a marginal subsidy. The
purpose of the wage subsidy was to stimulate employment after the 1973-75
recession. The total amount that a rm could claim as a tax credit was lim-
ited to $100,000 per year.13 The economist John Bishop studied the eect
of this scheme using time series analysis of the construction, retailing, and
wholesaling industries. He found that the NJTC program was responsible for
13See Daniel Hamermesh, 1993, Labor Demand, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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150,000 to 670,000 of the more than 1 million increase in employment that
occurred between mid-1977 and mid-1978 in the construction and retailing
industries. Another way of summarizing his results is that the point esti-
mates of the increase in employment that the tax credit stimulated by March
1978 was approximately 400,000, equivalent to an economywide increase in
employment of 0.5 percent. The program cost roughly $4.5 billion.14
Another study of the NJTC program using an analysis of the Department
of Labor survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census found that rms
which knew about the program increased employment 3 percent faster than
other rms.15
(b) Gera, Surendra, 1987, \An Evaluation of the Canadian Employment Tax
Credit Program," Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 196-207.
The paper by Gera evaluates the 1978-81 Canadian Employment Tax
Credit Program (ETCP), which was structured like the NJTC program ex-
cept that it was targeted at high unemployment regions. The program pro-
vided a tax credit of varying amounts per hour, with higher rates for higher
unemployment areas, to employers who would create jobs dened as addi-
tional to their normal workforce. The paper concluded that the net social
benet resulting from the creation of an ETCP job was very signicant,
amounting to about 60 percent of the wage bill. It found that the greatest
benet came from the creation of jobs in areas characterized by high unem-
14See Hamermesh, ibid., page 192.
15See Perlo, Jerey and Michael Wachter, 1979, \The New Jobs Tax Credit: An Eval-
uation of the 1977-78 Wage Subsidy program," American Economic Review: Papers and
Proceedings, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 173-179.
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ployment rates. It found, however, that only 33 percent of the jobs attributed
to the ETCP during the rst two years of its operations represented an in-
cremental gain in employment. The average cost per incremental work-year
created by the ETCP was estimated to be $9,555 (1979 dollars)
(c) Goos, Maarten and Jozef Konings, 2007, \The Impact of payroll Tax
Reduction on Employment and Wages: A Natural Experiment using Firm
Level Data," LICOS Discussion Papers, No. 178, Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven.
Goos and Konings study the impact of a scheme where wage subsidies
were given directly to rms in Belgium as a structural policy. Belgium has
adopted the granting of wage subsidies to rms as a structural policy since
1983 under the name Maribel. In Maribel I introduced in 1983, employers
were given a reduction of 6.17 percentage points in employer contributions
for each full-time manual worker employed in the private sector, except for
rms in electricity, gas and water as well as nancial intermediation. There
were various modications through the years and \Maribel subsidies" ended
in the second quarter of 1999. From 1999 to 2004, employer tax exemptions
gradually converged towards a harmonized system of proportional and lump-
sum reductions for both manual and non-manual labor.
The authors used a panel of rm-level data with information about whether
or not a rm received subsidies and, if so, the amount of the subsidy received
in any given year. With the data set, the authors were able to examine the
impact of the wage subsidies given to rms on employment and wages. Their
headline nding was that wage subsidies given to rms increased full-time
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manual employment by 5 to 8 percent and pre-tax wages by 1 to 3 percent
without much evidence for displacement eects on other workers.
(d) Eissa, Nada and Jerey Liebman, 1996, \Labor Supply response to the
Earned Income Tax Credit," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111, No.
2, pp. 605-637.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is an example of a structural
program of wage subsidies given directly to workers. In a series of major
expansions since 1987, the EITC has grown to become a preferred program
to supplement a worker's income by tying the subsidy to work. The EITC is
a refundable credit so that any credit due in excess of tax liability is refunded
to the taxpayer in the form of a tax refund check.The paper by Eissa and
Liebman studied the impact of the Tax reform Act of 1986, which included
an expansion of the EITC, on labor force partipation and hours of work. The
expansion of the credit aected single women with children but should not
aect single women without children. This feature allowed the authors to
conduct an empirical test identifying a treatment group (single women with
children) and a control group (single women without children). They found
that between 1984-1986 and 1988-1990, single women with children increased
their relative labor force participation by up to 2.8 percentage points. They
observed no change in the relative hours worked by single women who were
already in the labor force.
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4 Wage Subsidies in the Context of Growth
and Economic Inclusion in the Singapore
story
Using the concept of a production function, it is helpful to represent a nation's
output or real GDP as a constant-returns-to-scale function, Y = AF (K;hN),
where A is a measure of technology, K is physical capital stock, h is the
average educational attainment, and N is employment. In a market economy,
a rm's choice of the optimal number of workers to employ requires that the
following condition be satised:
AhFhN

K
hN
; 1

=
wh
1 + sw
: (21)
While our focus in this paper has been on how an increase in the wage subsidy
rate, sw, has the potential to expand employment and lift up the real earnings
of low wage workers, equation (21) puts into context that there are other
factors that also aect employment and real earnings, particularly over the
medium to long term. Three other factors that play a part in improving the
lives of workers are technology, education, and investment activity.
To see how these three factors play a part in strengthening economic
inclusion|drawing people in the economy to be engaged in the formal work-
place and delivering a good living wage|we turn to the experience of Sin-
gapore. Four charts at the back of this paper providing time series data on
a measure of the standard of living (real GDP per capita), the unemploy-
ment rate, a measure of the skilled-unskilled wage gap, and the ination rate
tell a story of how it is possible to lift a whole nation from relatively high
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unemployment and low standard of living to relative economic prosperity.
Going from under 20 percent of U.S. standard of living in 1960 to about
parity today involved harnessing the right institutions and policies to gen-
erate catch-up growth. The decision of early political leaders in Singapore
to become economically integrated into the global economy through trade in
goods, capital, and ideas allowed the nation to enjoy the benets of closing
the wide technology gap at independence. As the economy raced towards
the world technology frontier, private investments grew to take advantage of
the relatively large supply of unskilled labor in the early days of industrial-
ization to produce goods to sell into the world market. As the competitive
industries in the early days of industrialization were relatively unskilled labor
intensive, there was a relative increase in demand for unskilled workers which
lifted the earnings of low wage workers and lowered their unemployment rate.
The chart on the unemployment rate shows the general decline of unemploy-
ment as the economy grew, even though the path of the unemployment rate
was by no means smooth.16 Because the forces of technology catch-up were
so strong, causing the value marginal product of labor to steadily increase,
the government was able to rely on the dened contribution social security
system, called the Central Provident Fund (CPF), already in place before in-
dependence to raise the contribution rates of both employees and employers
without hurting jobs. By the early 1980s, an employee contributed 25 percent
of his or her basic wage to the CPF and the employer contributed the same
amount to the worker's retirement fund.17 The employers' CPF contribu-
16The chart of the ination rate shows that, apart from the spike in the ination rate
during the oil crisis of the 1970s, the country has experienced non-inationary growth.
17Workers can withdraw their retirement funds at 55 years of age but must maintain a
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tion rates provided the government an instrument to ght recessions, which
it used in 1985-86 when the economy went into a sharp recession. A ma-
jor plank of the counter-recessionary policy was to give rms wage subsidies
through a big reduction in the employers' CPF contribution rates, eectively
reducing the rms' marginal cost of employing an additional worker. This
CPF contribution rate cut applied to each worker on the rm's payroll. When
the economy recovered, the CPF contribution rates were gradually restored.
Similar measures were adopted during the 1997-98 Asian nancial crisis and
later in 2003 when the economy faced a huge collapse of domestic aggregate
demand in the face of a virus contagion known as Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS).
It is interesting to note that the wage subsidies to rms given through the
cut of employers' CPF contribution rates in all these episodes received sup-
port of the country's labor union called the National Trades Union Congress
(NTUC). It required a level of trust among union leaders, business leaders,
and government (which was itself a major public sector employer) built on
the understanding that the sacrice made by workers during the recessions
would be rewarded when the economy recovered. Indeed, the CPF contri-
bution rate cuts implemented at the height of the recessions were restored
when the economy was well on the recovery path, typically in a few steps.
In these earlier episodes, as the cut in the employers' CPF contribution
rates were not made up by government, workers' essentially faced wage cuts in
order to save their jobs. In the 2009 sharp recession, however, the government
stepped in to introduce a Jobs Credit scheme that subsidized each worker on
minimum sum in their CPF account that can be used to purchase an annuity.
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a rm's payroll by an amount equal to 12 percent of pay up to the amount
S$2,500, the median worker's wage in Singapore. As we can see from the
rst two charts, despite the sharp drop in real GDP per capita in 2009, the
rise in the unemployment rate was comparatively smaller.18
In the process of growth, the government's scal position improved as
companies were set up and jobs were created thus increasing the tax base.
The government had increased resources that it used to make huge invest-
ments in education. The improvement in the average level of human capital
of the workforce shifted the country's comparative advantage in each decade
18After reading an earlier draft of this paper, Paul Romer raised a question, \If the
government was using wage cuts in the earlier recessions, what explains the smaller rise in
unemployment in 2009?" In response, I suggest that the nature of the shock in 2009 was
somewhat dierent from the 1980s. The nature of the major economic shock that caused
the 1985 to 1986 recession is the rapid wage increase not matched by productivity growth
in the early 1980s. Thus, despite the quantitatively large CPF rate cut on employers'
contribution, it only partly reversed the original cause of the recession. In the 2009
recession, however, the shock was a fall in aggregate demand shown up as a collapse
of export demand. The wage subsidy to rms directly reduced rms' marginal factor cost
and helped small businesses survive in 2009.
The rapid speed of policy response in 2009 also played a part. The economy registered
negative 1.6 percent real GDP growth in 1985 and unemployment in 1985 was 4.1 percent
compared to 2.7 percent in 1984. The Economic Committee chaired by the current Prime
Minister submitted its recommendations in February 1986 and the CPF rate cuts took
eect only in 1986. On the other hand, the Jobs Credit scheme was announced in Parlia-
ment during the budget speech in January 2009 and put into eect immediately. Firms
were told that if they kept workers in the rst quarter of 2009, they would get the wage
subsidy based on what their workers earned in the last quarter of 2008. The Jobs Credit
continued until end June 2010, on a reduced scale in the rst half of 2010.
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of growth towards more skill-intensive economic activity. Over the 1980s
and 1990s, growth was broad-based so that, even as the median worker's
skill level improved due to the huge investments in education, the earnings
of less skilled workers were pulled up proportionately more so the wage gap
measure showed a decrease. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the wage gap
has shown an increase prompting the government in 2007 to introduce the
Wage Income Supplement (WIS) scheme as a structural policy to boost the
earnings of workers in the bottom quintile. By the time the WIS scheme
was introduced to benet workers in the lowest quintile, giving wage income
supplements to those aged above 35 and earning less than S$1,500 and who
must have worked for at least six months in a year, the overall unemployment
rate had already fallen to the two to four percent region. The intent of the
WIS is to bolster the pay of low wage workers while giving them incentives
to hold a job.
5 Concluding Remarks
When one considers the potential for catch-up growth, one can only be op-
timistic about economic possibilities. A reliable way for a nation to fos-
ter economic inclusion is to rely on market mechanisms to bolster the pay
and employment of its workforce, particularly those of its low wage workers.
When a recession worsens the job prospects of an economy that, in more nor-
mal circumstances, is already struggling with high structural unemployment,
as is the case in South Africa, wage subsidies given directly to rms act to
lower the cost of employing an additional worker and thus to push out their
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demand for labor. As jobless low wage workers are re-integrated into the for-
mal workplace through a wage subsidy scheme, a time-consistent and scally
responsible program to pursue growth opportunities over the medium to long
term holds the promise of making life better for all the country's citizens.
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Note: Data prior to 1986 are unemployment rate as at Jun of the year.
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